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CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-STATE FINANCING OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS-VIO-
LATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. Serrano 'v. Pries-t, 5 Cal. 3d
584, 48-7 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Reptr. 601 (1971)
The California Court of Appeals upheld a demurrer to the plaintiff's
alleganon that the California system of school financing, based on
property tax revenues, was unconstitutional.- The Supreme Court of
California reversed, holding that plaintiff school children had "alleged
facts showing that the public school financing system denies them equal
protection of the laws because it produces substantial disparities among
school districts in the amount of revenue available for education." 2
The California decision is the first judicial recognition of a duty to
finance schools in such a manner so as not to create wide disparities in
funds available to individual districts.3
A constitutional provision placing a duty on the state legislature to
provide essentially free public education4 is found in every state but
1. Serrano v. Priest, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (2d Dist. 1971).
2. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 618, 487 P.2d 1241, 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 625
(1971).
3. The original equal protection attack came in Board of Educ. v. Michigan,
General Civil No. 103342 (filed Feb. 2, 1968). See also Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310
F Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 44 (1970); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F
Supp. 327 (N.D. I1. 1968), aff'd. mem. sub nora. Mclnms v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322
(1969). In Mclnnis the court held that "individual needs" was such a "nebulous
concept" that the issue was nonjusticiable for lack of a manageable standard. Id. at
335. For an article arguing that school districts have a constitutional duty to participate
in national compensatory programs when "reasonably feasible" see Comment, Equality
of Educational Opportunity: Are "Compensatory Programs" Constitutionally Required?,
42 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 146 (1968).
4. The following are state consututional provisions calling for establishment of public
schools: ALA. CoNsr. art. 14, § 256; AIAsKA CONsr. art. 7, § 1; ARiz. CoNsr. art. 11, § 1;
ARK. COxsT. art. 14, § 1; CAL. CoNsr. art. 9, § 5; CoLO. CoNsr. art. 9, § 2; CoNN. CONST.
art. 8, § 1; DEL. CoNsr. art. 10, § 1; FLA. CoNsr. art 11, § 1; GA. CoN5-. art. 8, § 1; HAWAn
CoNsr. art. 9, § 1; IDA. CoNsr. art. 9, § 1; ILL. CoNsr. art. 8; § 1; IND. CoNsr. art. 8, 5 1;
IowA CoxSr. art. 9, § 12; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1; Ky. CoNsr. § 183; LA. CoNsr. art. 12,
§ 1; ME. CONsr. art. 8, § 1; MD. CoNsr. art. 8, S 1; MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, S 2;
Mio. CoNsr. art. 8, § 2; MrNt. CoNsr. art. 8, S 1; Miss. CONST. art. 8, § 201; Mo.
CoNsr. art. 9, § la; MoNrT. CONST. art. 11, S 1; NEB. CoNsr. art. 7, S 6; NEv. CoNsr.
art. 11, § 1; N.H. CoNsr. pt. 11, § 83; N.J. CONsr. art. 8, § 4; N.M. CONsr. art. 12,
S 1; N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 1; N.C. CONsr. art. 9, § 2(F); N.D. CONST. art. 8, § 148;
Omo CONsr. art. 6, § 2; OKLA. CoN r. art. 13, § 1; ORE. CoNsr. art. 8, § 3; PA. CoNsr.
art. 3, § 14; R.. Cozsr. art. 12, 1 1; S.D. CoN¢sr. art. 8, 5 1; TEns. CONST. art. 11, § 12;
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one.5 The role of free public education as an essential element of a
democratic society has been recognized by legal scholars,0 public com-
missions, 7 economists,8 and occasionally m judicial opimons.9
Intuitively, the concept that educational results are a function of
financial input has been accepted. 10 The one empirical study" on the
relationship tended to show that education was less a function of
wealth and more a function of social background. Assuming that some
direct correlation exists between wealth and educational achievement,
there can be mounted an "equal protection" attack because of the
wide 2 spending disparities.
TEx. CONST. art. 7, § 1; UTAH CONSr. art. 10, § 1; VT. CoNsT. ch. 2, § 64; VA. CONST.
art. 9, § 129; WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 2; W VA. CONST. art. 12, § 1; WIs. CoNsr. art. 10,
§ 3; Wyo. CoNsr. art. 7, § 1.
5. South Carolina's public education provision S.C. CONST. art. 11, § 5 (1895) was
repealed by No. 902 [1952] S.C. Laws 2223 and No. 653 [1954] S.C. Laws 1695.
6. Preface to J. COONS, W CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBuc
EDUCATION at XX (1970) [hereinafter cited as PRIVATE WEALTH]. The authors note
that "[tjhe goal of equal education may justify heroic judicial measures. " Id. at XX.
7. The United States Riot Commission's second recommendation was that commu-
ities "meet the urgent need to provide full equality of educational opportunity"
1968 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 438 (New
York Times edition).
8. Even those economists who favor the workings of the free market mechanisms
agree on "the proposition that a necessary step in breaking the chain of successive
generations of poverty and lack of motivation is satisfactory elementary and secondary
education for children." J. BuRKHEAD, PUBLIC FINANCE 15 (1964).
9. Free education has been termed "the most powerful agency for promoting co-
hesion among a heterogeneous democratic people at once the symbol of our
democracy and the most pervasive means of promoting our common destiny" Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216, 231 (1948). No comment
would be complete without the often quoted dictum in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). "[Elducaton is perhaps the most Important function of the
state and local governments. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms." Id. at 493.
10. In Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971), the court stated
that it must assume the existence of a direct correlation because "[to do otherwise
would be to hold that in those wealthy districts where the per pupil expenditure
is higher than some real or imaginary norm, the school boards are merely wasting the
taxpayers' money." Id. at 874.
11. U. S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (1966).
12. See, e.g., data in CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T. OF EDUCATION, AVERAGE DAILY ATTEND-
ANCE AND SELECrED FINANCIAL STATISTICS OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL DisTriuars 1965-66, 7-8,
27-28, 47-48, 65, 77-78, 97-98, 117-18, 135, 144, 155, 165, 175, 185, 207-08, 225, 237-3.8
(1967). See also R. JOHNS & E. MORPHErT, FINANCING THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 143, 248-51
(1960).
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Writers'13 have suggested that this -equal protection attack can take
either of two approaches. The first is generally termed the traditional
or economic approach. The essence of this test is rationality-is the
means chosen by the legislature reasonably related to the evil sought to
be eliminated.' 4 The second line of attack occurs when "fundamental
interests" 15 or "suspect" classifications' cause the court to apply a
more :stringent standard, requiring a showing of compelling 17 state in-
terest in the status quo. Either of the above elements is sufficient to
trigger the more stringent standard when present in a sufficient degree.
Therefore, as one element increases in offensiveness the other can de-
crease and still trigger the standard. In Serrano the court concluded
that education was a fundamental interest and determined that classifi-
cations were being made under a suspect criterion-wealth.28 Armed
with those findings, the court had no problem holding that if plaintiff
proved the facts alleged, the California school system would be held
to violate the equal protection clause.
Assuming 9 that the California school system is held unconstitutional,
what are the major legislative and judicial remedies? The initial prob-
13. PRIVATE WALIH, supra note 6, at 290.
14. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitu-
tional Test For State Financial Structures, 57 CA.m'. L. Rev. 305, 326 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Coons, Clune, and Sugarman]. For cases following this form of
analysis see Ferguson v. Skruda, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457
(1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 485 (1955); Danel v. Family Security
Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949).
15. Heretofore "fundamental interests" have been limted to dilution of franchise
and race cases. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Yick Wo v. Hopluns, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Strauder v. West Virgnia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880).
16. Wealth has been viewed as suspect classification when it is concerned with
criminal process or voting rights. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956); In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
17. E.g., Harper v. Virgima Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. Cali-
forma, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
18. 5 Cal. 3d at 614, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
19. As early as 1968 Philip Kurland made the following reluctant prophecy- "I
should tell you with some assurance, that sooner or later the Supreme Court will affirm
the proposition that a state is obligated by the equal protection clause to afford
equal educational opportumity to all of its public school students. But I would also
tell you that such, a decision, if it comes sooner rather than later, will probably only
be the creation of a problem and. not a solution to tis one." Kurland, Equal Educational
Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. Rev.
583 (1968).
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lem is the proper role of the judiciary itself. Until Serrano, the court °
had consistently held that there was no justiciable standard. It had been
the consensus of the legal writers that the body best suited to handle
any change in the school financing system is the state legislature.21 The
disagreement centered on the means to stimulate the legislature into
action.
The first line of reasoning is built on the premise that the legislature
is locked into its present position. The injured parties have no access
to the democratic process since by definition they are incapable of
voting 22 More importantly, the people in control, the wealthy, have
a vested interest in seeing that the status quo does not change2 Th
writers conclude that only the courts can liberate the legislature from
this political log jam.24 Even these writers agree that whatever the
remedy, it should provide flexibility 25 to the state in answering the
problem.
The second line of reasoning suggests that the change should be
strictly a function of the legislature. One writer2" argues that the court
20. E.g., McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nor.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). This change in judicial attitude is not
without precedent. It was as late as 1946 that the Court refused to apply the equal
protection clause to legislative reapportionment. Colegrove v. Green, 328 US. 549,
553 (1946) (alternative holding). See also MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 285-86
(1948) (Rutledge, J, concurring); Baker v. Carr, 179 F Supp. 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1959),
rev'd, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21. See generally Kurland, supra note 19; Note, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1154 (1969).
22. PrivATE WEALTH, supra note 6, at 292.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 293.
25. Id. Cf. 181.1-.76, 31 FED. REG. 5623-34 (1966); 181.54(f), 31 FED. REG. 5629 (1966);
12(a), 33 FED. REG. 4956 (1968), where the original order from the Department of
Health Education and Welfare established categorical defimtions of desegregation in
percentage figures. The free choice plans were to be evaluated by these defimtions.
The Department had to abandon these categorical definitions for quantifiable formulas.
26. Kurland explores the impotence at length as he states:
[The Court] is not very strong on creating legislation ab initio, except
where it falls within its province of adirmstering criminal justce. Given
even the least complex measure of the proper standard of equality, dollar
equivalence, how can it bring about the necessary change? For the principle
calls for a fundamental revision of the state governmental structure.
The Court, therefore, cannot leave with the local unit the discretion as
to how much it is to tax its constituents and what portion of that amount
is to be devoted to educational purposes. Will it then command that all
educational expenditures shall be made by the state and no local government
unit shall supplement the grant? Will it then tell the state how it shall
raise the necessary revenues.
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is impotent to act in necessary areas to fulfill its decree. Others2 7 have
concentrated on the legislative function, exhorting their legislature
to act.
The foregoing argument is now largely acadermc as the courts in
Serrano and Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,28 have come to grips with the
problem and have held that the issue is justiciable. The defendants in
each of the above cases argued that Mclnnis v. Shapiro29 had authori-
tatively decided the issue. Both cases noted, however, that an affirmance
without a decision, although technically a judgment on the merits, 0 is
practically the equivalent of a denial of certorari.83
For purposes of this comment it will be necessary to assume that the
issue is properly before the court and that the plamtiff has sustained
his burden of proof, thereby obtaining a decision that the state financing
system is unconstitutional. The traditional remedy8 2 for a statute that
is found to violate the equal protection clause was either to abolish the
unconstitutional classification or to make the statute operate on every-
one equally The reapportionment 3 and integrationa cases showed
the need for a third alternative. That alternative must be one whch
allows an orderly transition from the unconstitutional system to a con-
stitutional one.
On October 21, 1971, the California Supreme Court entered an
order modifying the original Serrano opinion. In the modification order,
the court emphasized that the decision was not a judgment on the merits
and that if the existing system is found to be unconstitutional the judg-
Kurland, supra note 19, at 597 See also Kurland, Equal Educattonal Opportunity, m
Tim QuALITY OF INEQUALITY: URBAN AND SUBURBAN PuBuc ScHooLs 67 (C. Daly ed.
1968).
'27.. Oino LmIsLATnm SERVICE COMM'N, STAFF RESEARCH REP'T No. 38, SCHOOL FINANCE
EQuAiZATION IN OHo 54 (1959).
28. 334 F Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
29. 293 F Supp. 327 (N.D. IM. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nor. Mclnms v. Ogilvie,
394. U.S. 322 (1969). The Mclnni case was brought before a three-judge court as
required by 28 U.S.C. 5 2281 (1970), when a suit is brought to restrain enforcement
of a state statute on the ground of unconstitutionality The Supreme Court's jursdic-
uon in appeal from these three-judge courts is not discretionary. 28 U..C. § 1253
(1970).
30. See generally R. STERN & E. GRESMAN, SUPREvm CoURT PRACTICE: Jumsrnioz,
PROCEDURE, ARGUING AND BRIEFING TCHImQUEs, FoRMs, STATrEs, RuLEs FOR PRAencE
IN TE SUPREmE COURT OF TiE UN rnD STATES 195-96 (3d ed. 1962).
31. See D. Curne, The Three-Judge District Court ma Constitutional Litigation, 31
U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 14 n.74 (1964).
32. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
33. See Silver v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 270, 405 P.2d 132, 46 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1965).
34. See Brown v. Board of Educ, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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ment should be one that would allow an orderly transition to a consti-
tutional system. 5
Thus, California is following the third alternative, declaring the
present system unconstitutional and allowing the legislature to make
the necessary changes.36 Writers3 7 have argued that this flexibility is
of great importance.
The final question deals with the power of the judiciary actively
to remake the system in case the legislature38 fails to act. The court may
issue a mandatory injunction 9 ordering the state officials to implement
the desired remedy where the public interest is sufficient. This manda-
tory injunction is enforceable by the court's contempt power.40 There
is some authority that the court could appoint a receiver 41 to manage
property under its direction.
It is clear that the court can implement a system of education that
will comply with the mandates of the fourteenth amendment, either
by allowing the state legislature to respond or by judicial decree and
supervision. The remainder of this comment will explore the viable
alternatives to the present system without regard to the method of
implementation.
Initially it must be recognized that school financing has two com-
ponent parts: (1) fund raising and (2) the administration of those
funds to the consumption unit, the student. These two 'elements are
usually in a dynamic relation to each other but for the sake of analysis
here it must be assumed that they are separable.
35. Serrano v. Priest, 41 A.L.R. 3d 1187, 1218 (1972).
36. The Supreme Court has recognized that education presents a unique situation
where this type of relief is particularly appropriate. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373
U.S. 526, 532 (1963).
37 Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, supra note 14, at 305.
38. "[It is now settled that responsibility for formulating and implementing a plan
falls iitially upon the defendant. Responsibility shifts to the trial court or ultimately
the appellate court only if the defendant fails to meet his duty" Note, supra note 21,
at 1141. See also Hall v. West, 335 F.2d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 1957).
39. E.g., Edison Illumnating Co. v. E. Pennsylvania Power Co., 253 Pa. 457, 98 A.
652 (1916); cf. Virginia Ry v. Ry Employees System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 5i5,
552 (1937).
40. See generally Comment, Legal Sanction to Enforce Desegregation In Public
Schools: The Contempt Power and the Civil Rights Acts, 65 YA.E LJ. 630, 638-48
(1956).
41. H. McCuNrocK, EQUITY 211-12 (2d- ed. 1948); Note, supra note 21, at 1146;
FED. R. Civ. P 66. Cf. Burnite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U.S. 208, 212 (1927).
[Vol. 13.:'65,3
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FuNm RAISING
First, the alternative methods of financing will be examined. It
should be noted that educational costs could be paid out of a general
fund, but the following analysis is based on the premise that the best
alternative is to te educational costs to a specific revenue source.
Value Added Tax
The President brought national attention to the value added tax as a
proposal for an alternative to the property tax in the 1972 State of the
Umon address 42 The essence of the system is that a company would
pay a tax on value increase attributable to its handling of an item 3
This amounts to a sales tax and as such becomes a tax on consumpon. 44
Consumption taxes are by their nature regressive in character.45 If
reform of state school financing is the goal, a regressive tax is hardly the
proper vehicle.
Progressive Property Tax
Henry Howell, Jr., Lieutenant Governor of Virgima, has suggested46
a progressive property tax as an alternative. Under this plan the rate
would be determined by absolute value and productivity of the land.
Implicit in this system is the proposition that corporations, especially
large corporations, will be taxed at a higher rate. At first such a tax
objective appears fair, but on closer scrutiny it will be found that the
incident,47 the real tax burden, is either shifted forward to the con-
sumer4" or to a lesser degree backward on the labor. Little, if any,
is shifted to the investor 9 in terms of decreased return on his capital
investment.
Functional Income Tax
This type of tax is novel and was first conceived and structured by
42. Address by President Nixon, as recorded in 118 CONG. RIc. 158 (daily ed. Jan.
20, 1972).
43. A thorough explanation of how this system operates can be found m TBE
MoRAN GUAR TY SuRVEy 3 (Jan. 1972).
44. R. MusGRAvE, TaE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINAxCE 249 (1959).
45. Id. at 379-82.
46. Address by Lieutenant Governor of Virginia Henry Howell, Week-End Institute
of Virginia State AFL-CIO, Feb. 5, 1972.
47. R. MusGRAvE, supra note 44, at 205-31.
48. P, MUSGRAVE, supra note 44, at 325. Once the shift to the consumer has been
made the analysis is the same as notes 44 and 45 supra and accompanying text.
49. Cf. M. KRzyzANiAX & R. MUSGRAVF, Tan SHariNG oF THE CORPORArTON INCOME
TAx 63-67 (1963).
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John Coons and Stephen Sugarman.5 0 The goal of this taxing system is
to eliminate as far as possible wealth as a determining factor in educa-
tional opportunity Essentially the system works simply; a family unit
determines what level of spending per child they want (effort) They
then compare the desired effort with the family income level to deter-
mine the amount of the tax." This system is very progressive and allows
the family unit to decide the level of educational expenditure without
regard to wealth.
FUND ADMINISTRATION
The second part of the problem is the determination of how to dis-
tribute the funds collected. This involves a very fundamental and emo-
tional question. Can the local school district maintain control over its
function?5 2 One writer has expressed the opinion that by the very
nature of equalization plans, the local unit must lose some of its inde-
pendence. 53 It will be shown later' how equalization and local con-
trol can work in complete accord.
Under the present systems of financing there are statutes that are
blatantly anti-equalizing 55 as well as statutes that appear to be equaliz-
mg but, due to complicated procedures, are in fact anti-equalizing
Very generally an anti-equalizing statute redistributes the wealth up-
ward, that is, it increases the benefits to the rich and burdens to the
poor. What are the alternatives?
Equal Dollar Expenrditure
The most basic remedy would be an order of equal expenditure per
pupil. Such a remedy would satisfy the equal protection clause. One
50. Coons and Sugarman, Family Choice m Education: A Model State System for
Vouchers, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 321, 330-34 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Family Choice].
51. Id. Coons and Sugarman postulate the following example: A family with a
$4000 income wants to spend $600 per child on education, therefore, it pays $16.50;
if the family decides to spend $1500 per child the tax would be $54.50. A family
with a $20,000 income would pay $440 and $1,218 respectively Id. at 331.
52. This was evident in the emphasis given by the President in the 1972 State of
the Union Address. Address by President Nixon, as recorded in 118 CoNG. REc. 15
(daily ed. Jan. 20, 1972).
53. A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS POOR SCHOOLS 206 (1968).
54. See notes 73-88 tnfra and accompanying text.
55. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17091 (West 1969); 122 ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8(2) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1967).
56. N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 3602-09 (McKinney Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAws, tit. 16
ch. 7, § 20 (Supp. 1967). See generally PUBLIC WEALTH, supra note 6, at 164-200.
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writer57 has suggested that this "simplistic criterion" would be very
inadequate. Such a system would not recognize unusual circumstances
which require compensatory education. 58 Furthermore, it would not
allow the local unit to decide what level of expenditures it could make.50
ThUs would be the very essence of central control.
Consolidation
Consolidation is a very basic remedy It would continue the tradi-
tional financing system but would merely redraw the district bound-
aries. The question remains: Can the boundaries be redrawn so as to
create substantially similar per pupil tax base? This question has to be
answered in the affirmative in order to pass an equal protection analysis.
The California experience is illustrative. Under the present system, 0
the per pupil tax base ranges from a high of $952,156 to a low of $103-
a ratio of 10,000 to 1. One writer6 suggests that under a realistic con-
solidation plan the ratio could be reduced to 22 to 1. Needless to say,
this would be an improvement but it is not certain that a 22 to 1 ratio
would survive an equal protection attack.
Individual Responsibility
Under this system the state would pay for the initial cost of educa-
tion. The student in return pledges a certain percentage of his future
income. The percentage would be determined by the number of years
of education and the relative expense. 6' The main advantage in such
a system is that it allows the value of the benefit (future income) to de-
termine the individual's liability One who did not succeed financially
would pay little or nothing for his education while the very successful
would pay several tumes the actual cost. The practical disadvantages are
obvious: (1) the administration of a collection system and (2) the lag
in return to the state.
57. Preface to A. WISE, RicH SCHOOLS POOR ScHOOLS at xli-xii (1968).
58. See note 3 supra.
59. See generally, PRIVATE WEALTH, supra note 6; A. WisE, supra note 53; Kurland,
supra note '19.
60. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 592, 487 P.2d 1241, 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606
(1971).
61. J. Bua-anm, STATE AND LOCAL TAxEs FOR PuBLcI EDUCATION 45 (1963).
62. Friedman has outlined the mechanics of such a system for vocational training
in M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 100-07 (1962).
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The Ohio Plan0
Basically this is a compromise plan designed to make the foundation
guarantee at a level that corresponds to the wealth of the average
district. Here the state guarantees that a district will be no lower m
resources than the previously average district." This plan corresponds
to the basic minimum principle structured in Douglas v. Californa..5
The basic fallacies in the application of such a computation have been
pointed out in one commentary 0 6 Additionally, there is no guarantee
that this plan will meet the requirement of equal protectionY.7
Percentage Equalizing
The idea of percentage 'equalizing was popularized by Charles S.
Benson. 8 In its pure form the system equalizes the wealth differentials,
but as has been shown" the political process of compromise has frus-
trated its application. Under this plan the state sinply pays a percent-
age share of the local budget. The percentage share is inversely related
to the wealth of the district. To determinme this share the local wealth,
determined on a per pupil basis, is divided by the wealth in the key
district, ideally the richest district. This ratio is then subtracted from
1 to determine the percentage the state will pay of the local budget.
63. S. BAILEY, AcHEvING EQUALTY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPoRTUmTY REPoRT, prepared
for OmIo FOUNDATIONS (1966).
64. An explanation of the mechamcs and critical analysis of the system can be
found in A. WISE, supra note 53, at 204-07
65. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
66. See Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, supra note 14.
We have suggested that the analogy to Douglas is hurtful, because of
its guarantee of representation, not equality of representation, appears to
correspond to the wide spread "foundation" programs in public education
and thus tends to validate existing discriminations, the analogy is
treacherous to begin with, for we are comparing things that are quite
unalike. The hypothetical right to counsel case just posed would compare
the quality of state-supplied counsel with privately employed counsel. But
proposition I involves only a comparison of state-supplied education with
state-supplied education not with private or the 'best' education (whatever
that is).
Id. at 365.
67. See notes 13-18 supra and accompanying text.
68. C. BENSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 242-46 (1961); C. BENSON, THE
CHERFuL PRosPECr: A STATEMENT ON THE FuruRE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 90-94 (1965);
C. BENsoN, STATE AID PATmNS IN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 214-32 (J. Burkhead ed.
1964).
69. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
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This system aclueves one primary goal, that of local control.1 0 The
local unit determines the rate of taxation in its district and the amount
and categories of distribution. In addition, tlus system raises the power
of the poorest districts to levels comparable to relatively rich districts.
Some writersr1 have attacked the Benson formulation, charging that
it is merely a compromise. The compromise elevates the poor districts
but allows the rich to maintain their preferred position.
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Po'wer Equalizing
Power equalizing is a concept of financing and distribution that has
been structured by Messrs. John Coons,73 William Clune,74 and Stephen
Sugarman,75 acting in various capacities. 76 It is convenient to define three
basic terms at this time. Offering is the average number of dollars spent
in current operating expenses per public school pupil. Wealth is the
dollar value of a given tax source per public school pupil. Effort de-
scribes the tax rate levied against a given resource. 7 In the traditional
state financing system the amount of the offering is a function of both
effort and wealth of the local district, "supplemented" by state aid.
Under a power equalizing system the amount of the offering becomes
solely a function of the effort.78 The local school district determines
at what rate it wishes to tax itself.79 This effort automatically sets the
70. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
71. See PRIVATE WEALr, supra note 6, at 174-80.
72. The results here are very similar to the Ouo Plan. Notes 63-67 supra and
accompanying text.
7-3. Professor of Law, Umversity of California, Berkeley
74. Member of the Illinois Bar.
75. Member of the California Bar.
76. The following works present an example of their numerous writings: J. CooNs,
W CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRrvATE WEALTH AND PUBLiC EDUCAiON (1970); Coons,
Clune, and Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for
State Financial Structures (1969); Coons and Sugarman, Family Choice m Educatiom
A Model State System for Vouchers (1971); Coons, Recreating the Family's Role in
Education, in 3 IINEuAin-Y IN EDUCATION I (Harvard Center for Law and Educ. ed.
1970); Coons, Clime, and Sugarman, Recreating the Family's Role m Education, in NEw
MODELS FOR AvMRCAN EDtcATON 216 (J. Guthne ed. 1970). John Coons acted as
attorney of plaintiff school children in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F Supp. 870 (D.
Minn. 1971). John Coons and Stephen Sugarman filed an armcus curiae brief in
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
77. Coons, Clune and Sugarman, supra note 14, at 310.
78. Id. at 319.
79. Note that the tax base need not be property See notes 50-51 supra and ac-
companying text.
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offering per pupil to be paid out of the state funds (from whatever
source derived) 80 A chart will clarify this system.,'
A B C
Percentage rate Primary Secondary
of property tax offering offering
.5% 300 500
1.0% 400 600
1.5% 500 700
The district selects a tax rate from column A, say 1.0%, this would
provide $400 per primary pupil and $600 per secondary pupil from the
state no matter how much revenue is actually raised. The revenue
that is raised would go to the state. This is necessary because if local
districts were allowed to supplement the state grants the current dis-
parities would again arise. 2
A variation on the above is family power equalizing. The concept is
the same but with the sole difference being a change in the decisional
unit from the district to the family 83  Thus, a family decides what
level of offering it wants for its childrens4 and then compares that to
its income to determine the tax owed."5 The state would then issue
script to the family, which could be used in either private or public
schools. The participatmg school would have to accept the script as the
sole measure of tuition.86 The local control problem has been improved
upon despite fears to the contrary 87 The decision making unit has been
atomized to the greatest possible extent and the schools would be com-
peting for the students' dollars-a healthy state of competition.
The main criticism of the system is that it has a built in penalty for
those districts wishing to tax at a lower rate. Coons, Clune and Sugar-
man explain the penalty this way.
80. See notes 42-51 supra and accompanying text.
81. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, supra note 14, at 320.
82. Family Choice, supra note 50, at 331-34.
83. Coons, Clune and Sugarman, supra note 14, at 321.
84. The fact that the family has more than one child will not affect the offering
or tax bill. To allow different amounts of offering or tax to be a function of the
number of children would exaggerate the wealth discriminations beyond that of the
present system. PaivAm WEALTH, supra note 6, at 265.
85. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
86. PRivATE WEALTH, supra note 6, at 321. If individual foundations or any other
source was allowed to supplement the tuition, education would again become a func-
tibn of wealth.
87. See note 52 supra.
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As one district cannot control the actions of another, its high effort
must be paid for in part by state taxes collected to some extent
from districts of lower effort. If two similar districts seek sub-
sidization from without, each must keep up in the effort race.
This "penalty" of course, occurs in any system of subsidy based
upon matching grants affected by local decision making. This
factor also may tend to increase expenditures generally 8
Legislative Response
During the 1971 regular session an Education Voucher bil 89 was
introduced before the California Assembly The system would allow
the state to issue a voucher in specific amounts to each school child 0
The voucher must be accepted by participating schools as the sole
payment for tuition.91 This system varies from the "power equalizing"
system in one important particular, the offering is invariably fixed. No
amount of local choice would be able to change it. The taxing system
was considered in separate bills.9 2
The foregoing illustrates the principle that Coons, Clune, and Sugar-
man were advancing -9 3 Courts, applying the stimulus by declaring the
present system unconstitutional, would be followed by a legislative
response establishing a constitutional system. For seventy years legis-
lative reform had been frustrated. As in the reapportionment cases,
those in power have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
In 1968 an educator9e 5 conceived of a judicial attack on the system. The
legal writers adopted his theory and formulated a plausible argument.
The stimulus was provided and the legal log jam was broken. The
fears of some,96 that hearing of these cases by courts would be a case
of judicial overreaching that would stultify the system appear to be
unfounded. Slowly the American system is moving toward a more
just method of financing education.
TERRY L. POLLEY
88. PrvATE WEALTH, supra note 6, at 208.
89. A. 150, 1971 Regular, Session.
90. Proposed CAL. EDuC. CODE § 31184(a).
91. Proposed CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31158. This system raises some question about first
amendment violation as aid to paroclual schools. See generally, Note, New Trends n
Education and the Future of Parochial Schools, 57 CORNELL L. Rzv. 256 (1972).
92. AJ3. 1406, 1971 Regular Session; S.B. 801, 1971 Regular Session.
93. Coons, Clune and Sugarman, supra note 14, at 413-15.
94. PRiVATE WEALTH, supra note 6, at 293.
95. A. WISE, supra note 53.
96. Kurland, supra note 19.
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